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THE MEANING OF THE "INJURY TO
COMPETITION" PROVISION OF THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
HENRY D. OSTBEROt
F w statutes have been castigated more frequently or more
vehemently than the Robinson-Patman Act.' "One of the
most tortuous legislative pronouncements ever to be put on
the statute books" is the way Dirlam and Kahn describe the
Act.2 "... [A] grotesque manifestation of the scissors and
pastepot method of [legislative] drafting" is the character-
ization offered by Professor S. Chesterfield Oppenheim,
chairman of the Attorney General's Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws.3 "Vague" and lacking in any "detailed
set of guiding yardsticks" is what was said about the Act
in a recent federal court decision.4  And even fervent sup-
porters of the Robinson-Patman Act have been forced to
admit that the Act is "scarcely a model of clarity." 5
At the heart of most of this criticism lies dissatisfaction
with the so-called "injury to competition" clause. All other
doubts and confusion about the statute, and they are many,
seem to shade into insignificance when compared with the
turmoil caused by this clause.
It will be recalled that Section 2(a) of the Act does not
prohibit all acts of price discrimination, but only those
"where the effect . . .may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
fAssistant Professor of Marketing, New York University School of
Commerce. Member of the New York Bar.
149 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952).
2 DIRLAM & KAHN, FAIR COMISTTION 119 (1954).
3 Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation; Guideposts to a Revised Na-
tional Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. Rv. 1139, 1209 (1952).
4 Ruberoid Co. v. FTC, 189 F.2d 893, 894-95 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 343 U.S. 470
(1951).
5 ZORN & FELDMAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW Pvica LAWS Xi (1937).
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or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them.. . ; 6
The clause dealing with injury to "any line of competition"
was taken almost verbatim from Section 2 of the Clayton
Act.7 The sponsors of the Robinson-Patman Act were, how-
ever, aware of the difficulty that the government had experi-
enced under the Clayton Act in its attempts to prove that
discrimination in price caused a general injury to competi-
tion." They, therefore, shifted the emphasis of Section 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act from injury to a line of com-
merce to injury to individual competitors. This was accom-
plished by adding the competition with clause.9
There can be little doubt that Section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act is based on a philosophy quite different
from that underlying the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Sec-
tion 2(a) prohibits acts of price discrimination which may
result in injury, destruction or prevention of competition
with individual competitors. The Sherman and: Clayton
Acts, on the other hand, were concerned with the preserva-
tion of competition, and not with the protection of individual
competitors. There is a vast difference between these two
objectives. Obviously, practices which may injure competi-
tion generally may be beneficial to individual competitors.
Thus, a retail chain store organization which lowers its prices
in selected communities, with the intent of driving indepen-
dent competitors out of business, and which raises its prices
immediately upon achieving this goal, may hurt competition
generally. However, while injuring competition generally,
the firm may improve its own position as a competitor.
649 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952) (emphasis added). For
a general discussion of the Robinson-Patman Act, see Austin, Price Discrim-
ination, CommiTra ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (1954).
738 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (1952).
8 S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936).
9 On their face, the words "to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
any person who . . ." might seem to require the same general showing of
injury to competition as do the words "to . .. lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce. . . ." However, the legislative
history of the "competition with" clause shows that the addition of this clause
was designed to change the law so that the main concern of Section 2(a) was
"injury to the competitor victimized by the discrimination." Adelman, Effective
Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 EARv. L. REv. 1289, 1334-35 (1948).
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Similarly, practices which may hurt individual competitors
may benefit competition in general. To cite just one ex-
ample, it is clear that a businessman who is forced to lower
his prices as a result of competitive pressures may not make
as much profit as he would at a higher price and may there-
fore feel "injured." However, it would not be logical to
assert that competition had been impaired by this price
adjustment. In fact, it is such adjustments by competitors
which serve as the fuel operating the competitive machinery.
Competition is, after all, a contest in which different
individuals or organizations seek to gain the same thing or
somehow to exceed each other.10 Business competition, re-
duced to its most fundamental concepts, involves rivalry
among sellers to sell the same goods (or services) and rivalry
among buyers to purchase these same goods (or services)."
The success of one competitor necessarily implies the exclu-
sion of others, at least in regard to the transaction at hand.
This means that competition requires competitors, but that
persistently successful competition may eliminate them.
It appears that the sponsors of the Robinson-Patman
Act were not entirely aware of the paradox inherent in any
attempt to protect individual competitors as well as com-
petition. This conclusion emerges clearly from the debates
recorded in the Congressional Record.12 That the legislature
could have failed to understand the nature of competition is
slightly puzzling, since economists have given this subject
attention for nearly two centuries. Leading economists have
long argued that the competitive process carries with it the
seeds of its own destruction; that competition, by permitting
only the survival of the fittest, thereby destroys the mechan-
ism for the future selection of the fittest.13  Consequently,
an important problem in an economy based upon free enter-
prise is how to preserve competition without curtailing its
beneficial effects. The answer to this dilemma appears to
10 See Clark, Competition and the Objectives of Governmental Policy,
COMP ITION AND MONOPOLY AND THEIR REGULATioN 317, 326 (Chamberlin ed.
1954).
"1 See Dean, Competition as Seen by the Businessman and by the Economist,
THE ROLE AND NATRE OF COMPETMON IN OUR MARK-MNG ECONOMY (1955).12 For the start of the debates, see 80 CoNG. Rc. 8137 (1936).
13 See CLARK, ECONOMICS OF OvERHAD CosTs 434-35 (1923).
[ VOL. 32
1957] "INJURY TO COMPETITION" PROVISION 29
lie in striking a satisfactory compromise between vigorous
and continuous competition. Business competition cannot
be considered a single battle from which one rival may emerge
victorious. A free enterprise economy requires unceasing,
unmitigated rivalry between competitors, not only for the
present but for the interminable future.
Section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act cannot, there-
fore, be interpreted to outlaw every discrimination in price
which might injure some competitor. Section 2(a) applies
only when there is a potential injury of a substantial and
serious nature, which is reasonably unavoidable, and the re-
sults of which are traceable to the discrimination. Very few
law review articles have clearly indicated the extent and
nature of injury required by the so-called "competition with"
clause of Section 2 (a). A review of the pertinent principles,
therefore, seems desirable.
Generally speaking, the "competition with'" clause re-
quires a showing of five elements in order to establish com-
petitive injury within the meaning of Section 2 (a):
a. Potential injury;
b. To competitors;
c. Which is substantial and serious;
d. Resulting in injury traceable to the discrimination
in price;
e. Which injury was reasonably unavoidable.
POTENTIAL INJURY
Acts of price discrimination are within the scope of
Section 2(a) "where the effect of such discrimination may
be substantially to lessen competition .... ", 14 Consequently,
the Federal Trade Commission need not find that competi-
tion has been injured, but merely that it may be injured, in
order to find a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. In
this respect the lRobinson-Patman Act does not differ from
the Clayton Act; both statutes sought to deal with tendencies
1449 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (i) (1952).
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toward monopoly in their incipiency or, as the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary said so colorfully, to "catch the weed
in the seed" and "keep it from coming to flower." 15 The
Robinson-Patman Act, however, carried the incipiency con-
cept one step further than the Clayton Act, which was lim-
ited in application to discriminations in price which might
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
The Robinson-Patman Act undertook also to prohibit dis-
criminations in price which might injure competition with
the seller granting the discriminatory price, the buyer re-
ceiving it, or the customer of either of them."6
The Federal Trade Commission inferred and the courts
have held that the word nay, as used both in the Clayton
Act and in the Robinson-Patman Act, requires a showing of
more than a "mere possibility" of competitive injury, but
that proof of absolute certainty of injury is not necessary.1 7
Section 2(a) may, therefore, be satisfied by proof that
there is a "probability" that a particular discrimination in
price will have an injurious effect on competition or com-
petitors. However, a decision of the Supreme Court in 1948
threw some doubt, at least temporarily, upon the validity of
this "probability" test. Writing for the majority in FTC v.
Morton gSalt Co.,1S Mr. Justice Black said:
After a careful consideration of this provision of the Robinson-
Patman Act, we have said that "the statute does not require that
the discriminations must in fact have harmed competition, but only
that there is a reasonable possibility that they 'may' have such an
effect." 19
Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, criticized the majority
for adopting "reasonable possibility" as a standard of the
potential injury .required by Section 2(a). He called atten-
tion to the repeated use by the Court of the "probability"
test in earlier cases. He said.f
15 S. PEP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936).
16 See note 14 supra.
17 See, e.g., Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945);
Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1922);
Matter of A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 34 F.T.C. 1362 (1942), aff'd, 324 U.S. 746(1945).
18 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
19 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46 (1948).
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It is true that ... the [Corn Products] opinion uses the language
as to possibility of injury now quoted in part by the Court as the
holding of that case. But the phrase appears in such form and con-
text ... [that it] must appear to a fair reader as one of those in-
advertencies into which the most careful judges sometimes fall. 20
The controversy aroused by the majority opinion in the
Morton Salt Co. case is really quite fruitless. The practical
difference between a standard of "mere possibility" and one
of "probability" is, of course, readily apparent, but it is to
be doubted whether any significant distinction can be made
between a test of "reasonable possibility" and one of "prob-
ability." Any attempt to do so would constitute little more
than a barren game of semantics.2 1 This conclusion seems
to be confirmed by the Commission's attitude toward the
Morton Salt Co. decision. The Commission has not relied
upon the reduced standard of "reasonable possibility," if
indeed this represents any reduction in the proof previously
required under Section 2(a).22  In one recent decision, a
Hearing Examiner of the Commission used the two standards
interchangeably. 23 In general, however, the Commission
seems to prefer "probability" as the test of potential injury.24
It should be noted that the Supreme Court, which first an-
nounced the "reasonable possibility" standard in 1948, has
not reaffirmed nor amplified its original remarks on this
question.
Related to the issue of the standard to be used in de-
termining the existeme of potential injury to competition is
the question of which party must shoulder the burden of
proving this potential injury. Until relatively recently, it
was universally agreed that the Federal Trade Commission
had the responsibility of adducing affirmative proof to show
20 Id. at 57-58 (dissenting opinion).
21 Austin, Price Discrimination, CoIirr ox CONTINUING LEGAL EDucA-
Tnox 12 (1954).
2 See FTC Notice to Staff, Oct. 12, 1948, p. 8; Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Inter-state and Foreign Commerce of the Senate Committee on
Inter-state and Foreign Commerce, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 127, 729-30 (1948).
23 Matter of E. Edelman & Co., Docket No. 5770 (FTC March 5, 1955),
aff'd, April 29, 1955.
24 See Matter of Moog Industries, Inc., Docket No. 5723 (FTC April 18,
1955); Matter of Whitaker Cable Corp., Docket No. 5722 (FTC Feb. 10,
1954), aff'd, April 29, 1955.
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competitive harm in order to sustain a complaint under Sec-
tion 2(a).25 Evidence proving significant adverse market
consequences resulting from the discrimination was deemed
part of the Commission's prima facie case.2 6 The established
precedent to this effect was overturned in 1945 by a per
curiam decision of the Court of Appeals of the Second
Circuit. In Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTG,2 7 the court held
that once the fact that a seller charged two prices to differ-
ent buyers is shown by the Commission, the seller has the
burden of showing that competitive injury did not result.
The court said:
... Congress adopted the common device in such cases of shifting
the burden of proof to anyone who sets two prices, and who prob-
ably knows why he has done so, and what has been the result. 28
The Moss principle of assigning the burden of disproving
injury on any seller who grants different prices to competing
purchasers was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeals of the
Second Circuit in FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc.2 9  The
Supreme Court cited the Moss decision, with approval, in
FTC v. Morton Salt Co.3 There has, however, been much
unfavorable reaction to the Moss decision, which made lack
of competitive injury a defense to be pleaded and proven by
the seller.3 I
The Commission's attitude toward the Moss decision has
been puzzling. The Commission actually disavowed the
burden-of-proof principle of the Moss decision in its brief
opposing certiorari of the Court of Appeals' opinion in the
case. The Commission said:
The court below apparently interpreted the Act as meaning that
upon mere proof by the Federal Trade Commission that a respon-
25 Note, The Standard of Injury Applicable to First-Line Competition,
49 Nw. U.L. REV. 209, 213-14 n.21 .(1954).
2 6 ATTORNEY GsnENA.'s CoMMITIEE, REPORT ON THE STUDY OF Tim ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 161 (1955). See also A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 135 F.2d
453, 455 (7th Cir. 1943).
27 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
28 Id. at 379.
29 189 F.2d 510, 515 (2d Cir. 1951).
30 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
31 See O'Brien, The Robinson-Patman Act-Is It in the Public Interest?,
A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw 76 (1952); Note, The 'Injury' Require-
ment of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 197, 204 (1954).
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dent before the Commission had sold to two customers at different
prices, he has the burden of affirmatively proving that the discrim-
ination did not lessen competition or tend to injure or prevent it....
[T] he Commission has always construed the Act to require it as part
of its affirmative case to present evidence that a discrimination may
lessen or tend to injure competition. -The petition for certiorari cor-
rectly states that the Commission's argument in the court below was
not that respondent had failed to prove affirmatively that the dis-
criminations did not lessen competition but that it, the Commission,
had proved that the discriminations "injured competition." In seem-
ingly attributing a different position to the Commission, the court
below apparently misunderstood the Commission's argument.32
Once the application for certiorari in the Moss case had
been denied, the Federal Trade Commission did not hesi-
tate to reverse its earlier stand. In Matter of Standard Oil
Co., 33 the Commission said:
A prima facie case of violation of Section 2(a) may be estab-
lished by proving (1) jurisdiction, (2) goods of like grade and
quality, and (3) discrimination in price. Discrimination in price
here was shown by proving a difference in the prices charged com-
peting customers. Based upon the prima facie case thus shown the
Commission may draw from such prima facie case a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the effect of such discrimination may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly or to injure, destroy
or prevent competition. The burden then shifts to the respondent. 34
The Report of the Attorney General's Committee to
Study the Antitrust Laws concludes that recent decisions
"have receded" from the "presumption" doctrine developed
by the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit in Moss and
reiterated in Standard Brands, Inc. 35 It cites five cases to
support this conclusion. 6 However, only one of these cases
32 Brief for Respondent, p. 7, Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).3341 F.T.C. 263 (1945), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
34 Matter of Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263, 282 (1945), rev'd on other
grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
35 ATTORNEy GENERA'S COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE STUDY OF THE ANTI-
TRUST LAws 161 (1955).
36 Among the cases cited are: Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61
(1953); Mead's Fine Bread Co. v. Moore, 208 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1953),
rezd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 115 (1954) ; Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator
Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied for late filing, 344 U.S.
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actually supports the view that there has been a withdrawal
from the Moss principle. This is Matter of General Foods
Co.Y3 7 where the Federal Trade Commission stated that in a
proceeding to enjoin a discrimination in price "the burden
of proof to establish injury to competition is on counsel sup-
porting the complaint." The other cases cited in the Report
on this issue are not directly in point.38
While the General Foods Co. opinion indicates that the
Commission is not satisfied with the Moss principle, only a
short while ago Hearing Examiner Earl Kolb concluded that
"where purchasers, buying and competing in the resale of
the same merchandise, are charged different prices therefor,
the conclusion is inescapable that injury to competitive
efforts of the unfavorable purchasers is present." 3 In
Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co,4° Judge Freed
of the Northern District of Ohio, said:
It is obvious that the competitive opportunities of plaintiff were in-
jured when it had to pay Ford substantially more for the commodities
than its competitors had to pay and that the effect of such price dis-
crimination may be substantially to lessen competition and to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition. 41
If injury to competition is "obvious" as soon as the exis-
tence of a discrimination in price is shown to exist, it is, of
course, unnecessary for the Federal Trade Commission to
prove such injury. Judge Freed cited Morton Salt Co. as
authority for this proposition.
If the Moss doctrine is dead, as the Report of the
Attorney General's Committee insists, the body is still very
warm, indeed. It is true that many arguments can be mus-
tered to support the view that the Moss doctrine should bE
reversed; but this is not the same as saying that the doctrine
206 (1952); United States v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 118 F. Supp.
41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
37 Docket No. 5675 (FTC April 13, 1954). See also FTC Newsletter, Aug.
9, 1956.
38 See Levi, Antitrust Policy in Distribution, A.B.A. SEcrmoN OF ANTITRUST
LAW 85 (1955).
9 Matter of Whitaker Cable Corp., Docket No. 5722 (FTC Feb. 10, 1954),
aff'd, April 29, 1955.
40 1955 Trade Cases 68.
41 Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
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has already been overturned. Since the Moss case is a de-
cision of the Federal Court of Appeals, it can be overruled
only by a federal court of appellate jurisdiction of the Second
Circuit or the Supreme Court Such a reversal is perhaps
imminent. Many lawyers practicing in the antitrust field
hope so. It is certainly premature, however, to intimate that
a reversal of the Moss decision has already occurred.
INJURY TO COMPLVITORS
The injury required by Section 2(a) to make a dis-
crimination in price unlawful must be to competition "with"
the seller, the buyer, or the customers of either of these. It
would not violate the Act for a manufacturer of nails to
charge one price to consumers, another to building contrac-
tors, and still another to cabinet makers, provided that no
competing sellers were substantially harmed by this practice.
Similarly, a food wholesaler would be free to establish one
set of prices to hospitals, another to restaurants, and still a
third to supermarkets, again assuming that there were no
injury to competitive sellers. In brief, transactions with
non-competing buyers will normally be exempt from the
operation of Section 2 (a) .42
It is not an easy matter, however, to classify purchasers
into non-competitive categories in our complex and dynamic
market structure.43 Many retail stores sell some goods at
wholesale; most wholesalers undertake an occasional retail
transaction; more supermarkets than not carry drug prod-
ucts; some drug stores handle food items. This constant
expansion of the area of inter-competition of different units
in the economy has tended to make classification of buyers
into non-competitive groups, for purposes of pricing, rather
hazardous.
Neither the Federal Trade Commission nor the courts
have clearly indicated how many competitors must be injured
before Section 2(a) applies. In E. B. Muller Co.,4 4 a
42 
ZORN & FELDMAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAWS 106 (1937).
4 See Note, The 'Injury' Requirewent of the Robinson-Patman Act,
49 Nw. U.L. R-v. 197, 201-02 (1954).
44 142 F2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).
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processor of chicory was found guilty of violating Section
2 (a), although his discriminatory practices injured only one
competitor; this was an unusual case, however, since there
were only two major firms in the domestic chicory industry
at the time. In general, it seems reasonable to conclude that
Section 2(a) contemplates injury to competitors-that is,
two or more--but that exceptions will be made when the
nature of the competition in the industry or other factors
so warrant.45
SUBSTANTIAL INJURY
The Robinson-Patman Act requires "substantial" injury
to competition before Section 2(a) applies.46  This means
that loss of one sale is normally insufficient to bring the Act
into application, but it does not necessarily mean that the
Act is not violated until all competitors have been forced
into bankruptcy.47 The line, delineating the implications of
the "substantial" injury requirement, must be drawn some-
where between these two extremes.
Various verbal standards have been employed by the
courts and the Commission to express the injury to competi-
tion required by Section 2(a). In several cases the courts
stated that Section 2(a) requires a showing that the actual
or potential result of the discrimination was the gaining or
maintaining by the discriminating seller or by the favored
buyer of business which he would not have had in the absence
of the discrimination.4 8 In several other cases, a discrimina-
45 See ATrORxEY GENERAL's CommirrnE, REPORT ON THE STUDY OF THE
ANTITRUST LAws 161 (1955). "In some circumstances, to be sure, injury to
even a single competitor should bring the Act into play." Id. at 165.
46The term "substantially" was carried over from Section 2 of the old
Clayton Act into the Robinson-Patman Act.
47 ". . . [W]e construe the [Robinson-Patman] Act to require substantial,
not trivial or sporadic, interference with competition to establish the violation
of its mandate." Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786,
790 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied for late filing, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
""It is true that § 2(a) makes price discrimination unlawful only in case
it lessens, or tends to prevent, competition with the merchant who engages in
the practice; and that no doubt means that the lower price must prevent, or
tend to prevent, competitors from taking business away from the merchant
which they might have got, had the merchant not lowered his price below what
he was charging elsewhere." Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, 379
(2d Cir. 1945).
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tion which forced the injured competitor either to lower his
price, and thereby reduce his profits or competitive ability,49
or else forced him to maintain his price, but lose business,
has been held to involve "substantial" injury to competi-
tion.50 The essential concept behind both of these standards
is that some trade or patronage is diverted to the discrim-
inating seller or away from the non-favored purchasers.
De minimis non curat lem. The law does not care for,
nor take notice of, trifling matters. This principle was ap-
plied in Matter of Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp.,5 1 where it was
found that the maximum difference in annual profits result-
ing from the discrimination was $6.50. This was held too
insignificant to justify Federal Trade Commission inter-
vention. However, in the application of the de minimis
principle, strict reliance on figures and percentages is not
warranted. The amount involved in the discrimination must
be considered in relation to the nature of the product, 2 the
intensity of competition found in the resale of the product,53
the normal margin of profit on the product,54 and even the
49 The Federal Trade Commission and the courts have recognized that a
seller who receives a smaller gross margin than his competitors may be in-jured in his competitive ability. See Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC,
324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945). In Matter of Moog Industries, Inc., Docket No.
5723 (FTC April 18, 1955), the Commission, quoting its Hearing Examiner,
said: "Any saving or advantage in price obtained by one competitor as against
another increases his margin of profit, permits additional services to be extended
to customers, the use of additional salesmen, the carrying of larger and more
varied stocks, and the establishment of branch houses for expansion of the
business." Id. at 7.
50 This appears to be the favored standard of the Federal Trade Commission.
Matter of Morton Salt Co., 39 F.T.C. 35 (1944), aff'd, 334 U.S. 37 (1948);
Matter of A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 34 F.T.C. 1362 (1942), aff'd, 324 U.S. 746
(1945); Matter of Corn Products Refining Co., 34 F.T.C. 850 (1942), aff'd,
324 U.S. 726 (1945).
5125 F.T.C. 537 (1937). In Matter of the Curtiss Candy Co., 44 F.T.C.
237, 275-76 (1947), the Commission indicated that a price difference of less
than one-half-of-one-cent on a box of twenty-four candy bars would fall
within the de ininis rule. In Matter of the United States Rubber Co.,
46 F.T.C. 998, 1103 (1950), the Commission hinted that a price difference
of two per cent or less on rubber footwear would also be within the de minimis
rule.
52 See ZORN & FELDMAN, BusINEss UNDER THE NEW PI ic LAWS 109-10
(1937).
53 See Matter of Standard Brands Inc., 30 F.T.C. 1117 (1940), aff'd, 189
F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951).
54 SeMatter of E. Edelman & Co., Docket No. 5770 (FTC March 5,
1955), aff'd, April 29, 1955; Matter of Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945),
rezfd on other grounds, 340 US. 231 (1951).
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nature of the industry.55 Thus, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion was quick to recognize that food chain organizations
might employ the collective benefits received from a number
of resources to gain competitive advantage over their inde-
pendent rivals, even though the concessions received from any
one supplier might appear insignificant.5 6 In Matter of
H. C. Brill Co., 57 it was held that a two and one-quarter
per cent discount on an ice cream mix was illegal, even
though this was a minor product in the typical grocery store.
The Federal Trade Commission stated that only by prohibit-
ing each individual discount was it possible to avoid the sub-
stantial cumulative advantage a chain store organization
would be able to acquire if it were to receive a large number
of such small concessions.5 8 A similar view was expressed
by the Supreme Court in the Morton Salt Co. case:
There are many articles in a grocery store that, considered sep-
arately, are comparatively small parts of a merchant's stock. Congress
intended to protect a merchant from competitive injury attributable
to discriminatory prices on any or all goods sold in interstate com-
merce, whether the particular goods constituted a major or minor
portion of his stock. Since a grocery store consists of many com-
paratively small articles, there is no possible way effectively to protect
a grocer from discriminatory prices except by applying the prohibi-
tions of the Act to each individual article in the store.59
A finding by the Federal Trade Commission that com-
petitive injury resulted from a person's or firm's practice
of price discrimination is seldom reversed by the courts.
This is due, in part, to the respect which judges accord to
the expert status of the Commission in matters of trade
regulation.6 0 It is due also to the fact-finding powers of the
Commission, which are similar to those of a trial court6 " A
55 Matter of Morton Salt Co., 39 F.T.C. 35 (1944), aff'd, 334 U.S. 37(1948).56 See SEIDMAN, Psica DIscmmm nA CASES 21 (1952).
57 26 F.T.C. 666 (1938).
58 Matter of H. C. Brill Co., 26 F.T.C. 666, 680 (1938).
59 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 49 (1948).
60 See Note, The lInjury' Requiremnt of the Robinson-Patman Act,
49 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 197, 201 (1954).01 
"The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evi-
dence, shall be conclusive." 52 STAT. 113 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §45(c) (1952).
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reviewing court may disagree with the Commission, but if
the Commission's findings as to the facts are supported by
substantial evidenoe, they are not subject to reversal.. This
principle was clearly recognized in a leading case involving
misleading advertising, where the judge said:
I reluctantly concur in the result, because the Commission has made
findings of deception of the public, which there is some evidence to
support, though in my opinion it is greatly outweighed by contrary
evidence.62
Findings of the Federal Trade Commission on the issue
of competitive effect are, therefore, likely to be conclusive.
The Commission's holdings on this point have been overruled
in only one instance since the passage of the Robinson-
Patman Act in 1936.61
INJURY T cAmABLn To PRICE DISCRmINATION
In order to subject a person to legal liability, it is neces-
sary to show not only that he is guilty of wrongful acts or
omissions and that another person was injured, but also that
the injury was a direct result of the wrongful acts or omis-
sions of the first party.64 This is the doctrine of proximate
cause.65 It is one of the fundamental principles of the law
of torts. It should be an equally valid precept in the field
of antitrust regulation.
It is normally necessary, therefore, to have some causal
relationship between the price discrimination charged and
This has been interpreted to mean "supported by substantial evidence." BEER,
FEDERL TRADE LAW AND PRAcrIcE 287-88 (1942).
62 Indiana Quartered Oak Co. v. FTC, 26 F.2d 340, 342-43 (2d Cir. 1928)
(concurring opinion).
63 See Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied for late filing, 342 U.S. 206 (1952). Even in this case,
the court appeared reluctant to reverse the Commission. The court, in its
opinion, stressed the fact that the Commission had itself overturned the findings
of the trial examiner and that one of the commissioners had dissented.
64 Coo=rx, ToRs 49-50 (rev. ed. 1930).
65"The early common law made no distinction between proximate and re-
mote cause as the basis of liability, either civil or criminal. A man not only
acted at his peril, but was liable for all the consequences of his acts, no matter
how remote. . . But by the modern rule liability for harm is imposed only
upon the person whose wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the
harm, not upon one whose wrong is merely the remote cause." Ibid.
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the injury to competition required by Section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, even though this may be difficult to
do in some cases.6 6 There is no doubt that non-price factors,
such as the promotional skills used in selling the product
and the services offered in regard to the product, play an im-
portant role in the buying decision.67 It is not logical, there-
fore, to infer an injury to competition from a mere showing
that the seller supplying the retailer discriminated against
him. Such a retailer may, actually, make substantial gains
against his rivals, despite the fact that he may be forced to
pay a somewhat higher price for his goods than they. He
may be able to do this by establishing cordial relations with
his customers, by the use of skillful selling techniques, or by
maintaining attractive store displays. On the other hand, it
is also possible that his business may decline, not because he
pays a higher price for his stock than his competitors, but
because he is rude to customers, closes his shop early in the
day, or for any one of a large variety of reasons. It is, there-
fore, not proper to relate automatically a business reversal
to a contemporary price discrimination against the person
or firm experiencing such reversal. In order for a discrim-
ination in price to violate Section 2(a), it must directly
cause the injury to competition required by that Section.
The courts have, unfortunately, given scant attention to
the proximate cause doctrine in price discrimination cases.
Several recent opinions have, however, resurrected this tra-
ditional doctrine of the common law in its application to
Robinson-Patman Act litigation. In Klein v. idonel Corp.,6 8
the court said:
There must be a proximate relationship between the injury to
his business, of which the defendant complains, and the alleged illegal
act of the defendant, which is asserted as the cause of the injury.
The injury must be the natural or probable effect of the asserted
illegal act.69
66 See SEIDMAN, PRicE DIScRIMINATION CASES 19-20 (1952).67 See Chamberlin, Some Aspects of Non-Price Competition, THE ROLE AND
NATuRE OF COMPErrrION IN OUR MARENG ECONOMY 30 (Huegy ed. 1954).18 138 F. Supp. 560 (D. Del. 1956), aff'd, 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956).
69 Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560, 565 (D. Del. 1956), aff'd, 237
F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956).
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The proximate cause doctrine is especially significant in
cases where a price discrimination is alleged in regard to
products which are subsequently sold as part of a larger
product. Thus, in Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. 'V.
FTC,7 0 it was held that a difference in price of two to three
dollars charged to different oil-burner manufacturers on the
purchase of regulator controls, for use in heating plants, did
not violate Section 2(a). The court stated:
It may be true that if the manufacturers were generally selling con-
trols as such, a differential of two or three dollars in the price they
paid for them would have a substantial effect on the price obtained.
Under such circumstances a finding that a competitive advantage in
purchase price paid would necessarily give rise to a competitive ad-
vantage in sale price would perhaps be justified. But where the
controls were used in the manufacture of burners, the cost of which
was determined by many other factors--cost of other materials and
parts, service, advertising, to mention only a few-it cannot be said
that discriminatory price differentials substantially injure competition
or that there is any reasonable probability or even possibility that
they will do so. 71
The court, thus, said that there was no injury-traceable
to the discrimination; that there was no proximate~rflation-
ship between the discrimination in price on the r egulator
controls and the competition of heating plants, of whichlft.he
controls became a part.
No case has ever been adjudicated by the Commission or
the courts involving price discrimination as between cus-
tomers purchasing for the purpose of industrial consumption.
The probable reason for this is that the relationship between
a discrimination in price in the sale of operating supplies and
capital equipment, which normally constitute only a small
fraction of total business expenses, and the ability of the
purchaser to compete in his line of endeavor is likely to be
extremely remote.
There is one important exception to the principle that
there must be a causal relationship between a discrimination
W 191 F2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied for late filing, 344 U.S. 206
(1952).
71Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 792 (7th
-Cir. 1951), cert. denied for late filing, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
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in price and the injury to competition required by Section
2(a). This is in cases where the discrimination is alleged to
affect first-line competition.72  This point can best be ex-
plained by means of an illustration. Let it be assumed that
Smith sells to two non-competing accounts at different prices,
this difference not being justifiable under any of the defenses
of the Robinson-Patman Act. As a result of the price quoted
to one of these accounts, a competitor of Smith, by the name
of Jones, loses a customer. This could possibly be an injury
to Jones, an injury to first-line competition. The injury,
however, did not result from the discriminatory character
of the two sales made by Smith. It resulted from the price
involved in only one of the transactions, and this could be
either the higher or the lower of the two prices. It resulted
from the fact that this price, whether it was the lower or the
higher one, was less than the price offered by Jones to the
same account. The discriminatory nature of Smith's trans-
actions was completely unrelated to the injury, if any, caused
to Jones. If Smith had charged both of his customers the
same price, there would have been no violation of Section
2(a), even if he had taken business away from Jones. The
mere fact that he charged different prices to non-competing
accounts, however, makes the transactions subject to legal
attack. The soundness of this exception to the proximate
cause principle is very doubtful.
REASONABLY UNAVOIDABLE INJURY
The law does not normally afford a redress for an injury
which could have been avoided by the injured party in the
exercise of reasonable care. It may, therefore, be assumed
that a court would not find an injury "with" competition
where a seller refused to meet his competitors' price, even
though he were able to do so without serious loss.73 If, as a
result of such a deliberate policy, he were to lose a substan-
72 Few legal writers have commented on this exception to the proximate
cause doctrine. See Hamilton & Loevinger, The Second Attack on Price
Discrimination: The Robinson-Patman Act, 22 WAsH. U.L.Q. 153, 166 (1937).
73 See ZORN & FEI DMAN, BusiNss UNDER THE NEW PiucE LAws 105(1937).
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tial amount of business, there would be no legal recourse.
The fact that he had been charged a discriminatory price
would probably be immaterial under such circumstances.
Although there has been no litigation on this point, it
seems safe to conclude, on the basis of the general context
of American common and statutory law, that the injury to
competition contemplated by Section 2 (a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act must have been unavoidable in the exercise of
reasonable prudence on the part of the person injured.
In summary, therefore, the competition "with" clause
of Section 2(a) does not apply to every minor injury to a
competitor resulting from a discrimination in price. It
refers only to actual or potential injury which is substantial
in nature, which is unavoidable in effect, and which directly
results from the discrimination.
LEVELS Op COMPETITION
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act specifically
states the levels of competition at which "competition with"
a competitor must be injured before the Section applies.
Section 2(a) reads, in part:
* . .where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrim,
ination, or with customers of either of them .... 74
The Act, therefore, speaks of three levels of competition:
that at which the seller operates; that at which the buyer
operates; that at which customers of the buyer operate7 5
7449 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952) (emphasis added). The
word "knowingly" in the phrase "who either grants or knowingly receives"
is of little significance and may be disregarded, except where buyer liability
is sought to be established under Section 2(f). See Shniderman, "The Tyranny
of Labels"-A Study of Functional Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman Act,
60 HARv. L. Rzv. 571, 581-82 (1947).
75 The phrase "either of them" in the clause "or with the customers of
either of them" refers to the seller granting the discrimination or the buyer
receiving it. Customers of the seller who might be injured by the discrim-
ination are, necessarily, competitors of the buyer receiving it; otherwise, there
would be no effect on competition. These customers of the seller operate at
the second level of competition. The clause "or with the customers of either
of them," therefore, really means "or with the customers of the buyer."
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The Commission has, on at least one occasion, extended the
coverage of the Act to include a fourth-level of competition,
that is, competition with customers of a customer of the
buyer.7 6
The debates in Congress indicate clearly that the
Robinson-Patman Act was primarily designed to prohibit
discriminations in price which might adversely affect com-
petition with the purchasers receiving such discriminations.
The statute was so worded, however, that it also embraced
discriminations which might inflict injury on competitors
of the seller. The most common type of discrimination in
price which gives rise to first-line injury is local price cut-
ting, which is sometimes undertaken by, a seller operating in
a large area in order to eliminate local competitors. There
have been few such cases under the Robinson-Patman Act.7 7
Most of the cases arising under Section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act are primarily concerned with injury
to competition between customers of the seller and their com-
petitors. Where a purchaser increases his sales or profits as
a direct result of receiving a preferential price from a par-
ticular seller, which is not made available to his competitors,
injury "with" competition at the secondary level exists. In
order for a violation of Section 2(a) to arise, it is not essen-
tial for the favored buyer to translate the discrimination he
has received into a lower resale price than his competitors;
it is sufficient if the benefits of the preference are employed
in some way to enhance his competitive position, such as to
76 Matter of Miami Wholesale Drug Corp., 28 F.T.C. 485 (1939). In this
case, a drug distributor who sold to other wholesalers demanded and received
a discrimination in price which he passed on to those wholesalers who bought
from him, who passed it on, in turn, to their retailer accounts. Receipt of
this discrimination by the Miami Wholesale Drug Corporation was held to be
a violation of Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, since it was found
to injure competition at the second level (Miami and its competitors), at the
third level (Miami's wholesaler customers and their competitors) and at the
fourth level (the retailers buying from Miami's wholesaler customers and their
competitors).
77 The leading case of first-line injury to competition under Section 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act is E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th
Cir. 1944), where the Muller Company was charged with cutting the price of
its chicory in certain markets where it faced competition, while maintaining a
higher price elsewhere.
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increase advertising, to expand sales personnel, or even to
augment profits.78
The secondary line of commerce is, however, not limited
to customers who resell the commodity purchased. It also
includes customers who purchase products for industrial con-
sumption, and buyers who purchase components for use in
other goods.79
Cases involving injury to competition with customers of
a favored purchaser, that is, with competition at the third
level, arise extremely infrequently.8 0 They are likely to occur
only when a purchaser who has been granted a preferential
price by the seller passes on a part of this lower price to his
own customers. The Federal Trade Commission decision in
the Standard Oil litigation suggests the possibility that in-
jury to third-line competition may occur when a wholesaler
passes on a portion of his trade discounts to retailers, espe-
cially when he does so with the knowledge and acquiescence
of the original seller.8 1
CONCLIUSION
Not every price differential is outlawed by the Robinson-
Patman Act. Section 2(a) of the Act establishes its own
standards for determining which differentials are permissible
and which are proscribed. The most controversial of these
requirements concerns that dealing with competitive injury.
The Robinson-Patman Act retained all of the original lan-
guage of the Clayton Act in this respect, and added words
of its own. The new language shifted the emphasis of the
Section from prohibition of those discriminations in price
which might injure competition in general to those which
might injure competition with individual competitors. This
change constituted a radical departure from the philosophy
underlying the Sherman and the Clayton Acts.
78 See EA", PaicE Disc lmiNATIo0 CASES 22 (1952).
71 Ibid.80 See Austin, Price Discrimination, COmmtE ON CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION 29, 48 (1954).81 Matter of Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), modified, 43 F.T.C. 56(1946), further modified and aff'd, 173 F2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rel'd on
other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
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Some injury to competitors is an inevitable concomitant
of the competitive process. It is, in fact, one of the goals
which induces competitors to compete successfully. The
Robinson-Patman Act is not, therefore, concerned with every
minor laceration suffered by a competitor as a result of a
discriminatory price. It is concerned only with those in-
juries which tend to debilitate the future effectiveness of
the competitive process. Drawing the line between rivalry
which is salutary and that which may lead to ominous
consequences requires the surgical skills of a learned prac-
titioner. Unfortunately, there have been numerous legal
decisions in the past where the rough-and-ready hand of the
butcher was more in evidence than the delicate fingers of
the surgeon.
Since the Robinson-Patman Act is designed to "nip in
the bud" practices which are deemed to have a tendency to
create a monopoly, it is concerned as much with potential as
with actual injury. This means that the Commission and the
courts, which are saddled with the responsibility of detecting
such tendencies, must often deal with future and unknown
happenings not susceptible of accurate measurement. The
reliance on presumptions, such as that developed in the Moss
case, is therefore understandable, but it is in no way jus-
tifiable. The law of the land must be dictated by social,
political and economic objectives, not by considerations of
evidentiary expediency.
The fact that violations of Section 2(a) will be easier
to prove if all sellers are required to have a uniform price to
all buyers is certainly no reason for administering the Act
in this direction; and it is no answer to state that the Moss
principle concerns procedural questions, rather than substan-
tive rights. The truth remains that most pricing policies
other than those of identical prices to all buyers are today
unwa fe, regardless of their ultimate legality.82  To the busi-
82 The late Mr. Justice Jackson once opined: "The law of this case, in
a nutshell, is that no quantity discount is valid if the .Commission chooses to
say it is not." FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 58 (1948) (dissenting
opinion). As a result of the Moss principle, the same may be said about
almost any price differential in interstate commerce. The effect-on-competition
requirement of Section 2(a) has, in effect, been read out of the statute in a
number of decisions.
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nessman, the test of a pricing policy is its freedom from pro-
tracted and expensive legal litigation, not its ability to be
vindicated before the Supreme Court of the United States.
The competitive-effect proviso of the Robinson-Patman
Act is the crucial cornerstone of the Act. Interpreted in one
way, it inhibits vigorous competition and goes against the
stream of the other antitrust laws. Interpreted in another
way, it becomes a well-adjusted member of the American
antitrust family. The Report of the Attorney General's
Committee urged that interpretation of this proviso be based
on the vigor of competition in the market rather than hard-
ship to individual businessmen. 83 The author concurs in this
recommendation.
8 3 ATROxEy GERzAx,'s CommITE REPORT ON THE STu v THE Awn-
TRUST LAWS 161, 163-65 (1955). See also Austern, Inconsistecies in the Law,
BusnrEss PRAcncEs UNDER FER A RmuST LAws 158 (1951).
